On 5 April 2005, the General State Administration of Work Safety announced that 1,113 miners had been killed in the first three months of 2005, an increase of more than 20 percent compared to the same period in 2004. What is the Chinese government currently doing - and what necessary measures is it conspicuously failing to adopt - to address this appalling mine safety record?
On 20 June 2002, a large gas explosion occurred at the Chengzihe Mine (run by Heilongjiang Province's Jixi Mining Bureau), killing 115 people. During Chinese New Year of 2004, State Council Premier Wen Jiabao visited this mine and shared New Year's dumplings with the workers. On 28 November 2004, the Chenjiashan mine (run by the Tongchuan Mining Bureau in Shaanxi Province) suffered an extremely large gas explosion in which 166 people died. On 1 January 2005, Wen Jiabao went to this mine and tearfully consoled the workers. It was during this time that I began drafting this essay, and I must confess to having been moved. According to conventional wisdom, when a gesture by a high-level official fails to produce any practical result, the official will generally be reticent to appear again in the same setting. Thus, Premier Wen's gesture was meaningful. Even so, sincerity and good intentions cannot solve the problem.
Since the early nineties, large-scale mining tragedies have occurred with alarming frequency. During this time, a number of gradual changes in China could be observed: The capacity of the government was gradually weakening, and with it the people's faith in the government; further, an overall sense of entitlement and selfishness was developing among the Chinese elite. These factors combined to create a sense of cynicism among ordinary Chinese people. For the Premier to go to such lengths to console the grieving families of miners was, in the current cynical atmosphere, a noteworthy show of warmth, and I do not question Wen Jiabao's sincerity. However, in a country where morals and principles are laughed at, and corrupt officials seem to be more intent on serving themselves than serving the people, I do question whether Wen Jiabao's tears will be able to move either the mine owners or government officials in charge of keeping the mines safe. Will Mr. Wen's tears somehow spur measures to reduce future mining accidents? It should be understood that politicians are not philanthropists; when they lack forceful and effective governing strategies, sincerity and good intentions cannot solve the problem. If there is no bread, even God cannot feed the people with love; after all, the Premier is only human.
The frequency of mining accidents creates a dilemma for the Chinese leadership. Understanding neither why mine disasters have only become worse despite years of stricter regulation and management, nor seeing where the solution to the problem resides, their sincerity and good intentions have little bearing in the reality of the situation. When I heard of Wen Jiabao expressing his intention to stand up for workers and promising them that, in his own words, he would "get the safety work done," I felt like asking him why not simply let the workers stand up for themselves? Why not let the workers "get the safety work done?" Listening to him tell the workers that they were "free to tell me about your difficulties by letter or telephone," I could only treat his words with the highest degree of skepticism. These days, with countless people making petitions to agencies at all levels only to be ignored (and even persecuted) who can take this kind of talk seriously?
In the past three years, China Labour Bulletin has published a series of reports and opinion pieces about mining accidents. We long ago predicted the periodic upsurge in mining accidents, discussed the reasons for their occurrence, and outlined solutions. We long ago pointed out and repeatedly stressed that without a fundamental reform of the safety management and monitoring system and direct worker participation in the mining safety management system all the governmental edicts in the world would not solve the problem. Neither the meting out of increasingly severe punishment for mine owners and guilty government officials, nor the closure of mines that fail to meet safety standards, nor an increasing investment in safety funds could possibly achieve results. Sadly, the events of the past three years have completely confirmed our predictions.
The increasing frequency of mining accidents has attracted the Central Government's attention. As early as March of 2004, the central government convened a national coalmine safety working conference unprecedented in scale. The director of the State Administration of Work Safety revealed in November of 2004 that, since the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, central government leaders like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Huang Ju have issued over 90 important memoranda containing over 120 points concerning mine safety. On 28 November 2004, on the eve of the disaster at Shaanxi's Tongchuan Mining Bureau Chenjiashan mine that killed 166 people, mining disasters were an important topic at the Central Economic Working Conference convened by the CCP Central Committee. Nevertheless, none of this deliberation made a dent in the frequency of mining accidents. Within a month of the Chenjiashan mining accident, at least ten other serious mine disasters took place across the country. And mine disasters are continuing to occur. Clearly, the government's hands are tied.
Whenever an extremely large mining accident occurs, the entire national safety monitoring system (as well as those at local levels) mobilises personnel in response. These national mobilisations have demonstrated time and again that the government's hands are tied with regard to mine disasters. On 13 December 2004, following a series of extremely large mining accidents, a State Administration of Work Safety's video conference was held; the impression given by the director of the State Administration of Work Safety was that the government was clueless. In addition to touting the useless "rectification measures" undertaken again and again, the director further displayed a general unwillingness to be forthright regarding the present state of affairs by making comments such as "the accident and death rate has stabilized and is declining" and "the death rate per million tonnes of coal extracted has reached its best record in history." In actuality, the director knows better than anyone that such statistics and figures might as well have been pulled from a hat; the number of mining accidents that local governments and mine owners have worked together to cover up exceeds such made up figures.
The leaders of the central government also feel that their hands are tied with regard to these frequent mining accidents. On 9 December 2004, 11 days after the Chenjiashan mine disaster, another gas explosion occurred at the Daxian mine in Yu County, Shanxi Province, killing 33. Perhaps this caused a collective emergence of repressed guilt or sudden realization of impotence in the face of a massive challenge. Even President Hu Jintao made it a point to confess that in light of the recent series of gas explosions the safety situation was indeed dire, and that comprehensive examination would need to be made and a system of responsibility implemented in each locality. Further, President Hu stated that any mines not meeting safety standards would face suspension of production pending rectification. These "instructions" are themselves nothing new; however, hearing them come from the penultimate Chinese leader is indicative of the level of official frustration with the unending series of coal mine tragedies.
What Hu Jintao's "instructions" reiterated was the Chinese government's basic strategy for governing the coal mine safety environment. On the basis of this strategy lie the basic management measures that have been implemented for years. The grim facts have proven, however, that this set of measures is fundamentally ineffective. According to the National Survey Report on the Safety Capacity of State-Owned Coal Mines (published by the State Administration of Work Safety on 27 December 2004), China's coal production was budgeted to reach 1.95 billion tonnes in 2004; China's coal mines, however, only had the capacity to ensure the safe production of 1.2 billion tonnes. This implies that implementation of Hu Jintao's "instructions" would actually reduce China's coal production by 700 million tonnes. In an era of tight supply, high demand and increasing price, the results would be predictable: a supply gap of 700 million tonnes would lead to the inflation of the market price of coal. At the same time production of large- and medium-sized state-owned coal mines (which have better safety conditions) would be decreasing, causing an increase in the illegal mining of small shafts. Reckless small mine owners would multiply, increasing numbers of local government officials would be bribed, and more mine workers pushed towards death. The only result of this set of management measures will be perpetuation of the vicious cycle of China's coal-mining disasters. This cycle can be summed up as an increase mining disasters, leading to strict rectification and mine closures leading to reduced coal production and higher coal prices leading to an increase in illegal mines leading to an increase in mining disasters...
It's a vicious cycle begun long ago, one in which the central government has played an active role. Besides offering yet more proof that the leadership's hands are tied with regard to coal mining accidents, this cycle also offers a window into the minds of the establishment. Clearly, they are still trapped in the morass of planned economy thinking despite the reality that China is no longer in that age; with each level of government pursuing rapid economic growth, energy supply and demand is no longer something the central government can control. This is something that they should be well aware of; after all, it was on their orders that, a few years back, the government completely contracted out medium and small state-owned and collectively-owned coal mines to private individuals in the name of "unburdening" the central government. By relinquishing control of so many mines, the central government lost the ability to control either coal production or market price.
Local government officials, anxious to for a piece of the coal-profit pie, provide protection to mine owners looking to skirt government regulation. Moreover, despite appalling conditions, finding workers is never a problem, as bankrupt farmers provide coal mine owners with an inexhaustible supply of labour. It can be said that the seeds of these failed measures were planted on the day that the Chinese government relinquished partial control of coal energy resources. In the face of this reality, the actual result of Hu Jintao's instructions can only be that a finite number of large accidents in state-owned mines will become a countless number of smaller accidents in privately-held mines, and the true death rate from accidents will not only fail to decrease but, in all possibility, increase.
Facts have already proven that under current conditions of rising prices and demand combined with tight supply, the government's measures of issuing safe production licenses, closing small mines that do not meet safety criteria, and forbidding additional production over the mines' projected capacity have completely failed. These measures are not merely impossible to fully implement, but actually seriously impact the balance of supply and demand on the energy market, leading to the inflation of coal prices and further spurring illegal coal mining and blind over-production, the result of which is an increase in the occurrence and severity of mine disasters. At the same time, lip service paid over the past few years about implementing "responsibility systems for officials" and "measures to severely punish mine owners" have proven useless. On one hand, the exorbitant profits in the coal market lead wave after wave of mine owners to engage in illegal production; on the other hand, the two systems have brought government officials, and officials and mine owners, closer together in a profit relationship, which makes perfunctory inspections and covering up accidents a common phenomenon. We believe that the solution lies with a "Lesser of Two Evils" policy.
First, we must squarely face this cycle, again summarized thusly:
- Coal production increases to meet market demand (the only real way to bring down market prices);
- Increased production leads to more mining accidents;
- In reaction to increased mining accidents, mines not meet safety standards or producing beyond safety capacity are closed;
- Coal prices rise, spurring mine owners to increase production levels;
- Increased production leads to more mining accidents.
To extricate ourselves from this cycle we must first dispel an illusion, which is that, in a situation in which there are excessive profits to be made from coal production, the overall mine safety situation can be fundamentally improved. In other words, the urgent task of the moment is to stabilise and even lower the price of coal. We must reach this goal as quickly as possible. The government, aside from further dampening the overheated economy, must quickly and thoroughly improve safety measures in large- and medium-sized state-owned mines. After improving the safety management and monitoring system in these mines, the government can permit them to appropriately increase their scale of production and raise their output. Furthermore, we must change the current policy of suspending production for rectification at all of an area's mines after an accident occurs in one mine, and instead implement a dual strategy of addressing mine safety conditions and expanding the coal supply.
Specifically, the idea, when implemented, would look as follows:
- First, banks would make low-interest loan funds available to large and medium sized mines still under government control, with this money earmarked for safety equipment; further, in order to enhance safety, the salaries and benefits of mine workers must be raised. This will stabilise the ranks of mine workers. Labour unions must be reformed and strengthened, their capacities increased to include the inclusion of the workers themselves mine safety management and safety-related training. These mines meeting safety criteria would be permitted to expand their production scale and be encouraged to merge with mines and explore other forms of ownership.
- Second, a rigorous safety rating assessment would be performed on medium- and small-sized mines not under government ownership, and the current method of addressing the problem through reactionary measures, i.e. suspending production for a hundred days at a hundred mines following a disaster in one mine needs to be changed so that production is only suspended in those mines rated low for safety.
- Third, the current method, in which local governments are only concerned with suspending production and rectification, and not with re-starting production would be changed, because this "one size fits all" kind of management and rectification often comes with no re-start date. This is the main reason for local mines covering up accidents and starting work without permission. When the suspension of production and rectification of a mine is seen to have actual results, the mine should be allowed to resume production.
Of course, this dual strategy to both implement rectification and expand supply is a transitional one, and far from a perfectly sound policy. But the Chinese government should understand the "lesser of two evils;" the important matter at present is to quickly and continuously improve the mine safety situation. The severity and complexity of China's mine safety situation has already exceeded the imagination of government leaders. At this point, we cannot help but lay partial blame for this serious problem on neglect of duty by the former leadership of China and their so-called "economists." The ineptitude, ignorance, and shortsightedness displayed with regard to mine production management were astonishing. A number of years ago, at a time when the market price of coal was declining, the government viewed all state-owned coal mines as "burdens," neglected energy resources that should be controlled by government and international practices regarding their products. They turned the mine resources over to the lowest levels of government to be contracted out to individuals, allowing private individuals to engage in mining. At the same time, the government vastly decreased and even completely halted its investment in the safe production facilities of state-owned mines. These practices led to today's abominable mine safety situation and the huge "bill due" in terms of mine safety facilities. It is not possible to devise a perfectly sound policy all at once to change this situation.
It is not possible to have a perfectly sound policy all at once if at all, but it is a goal that can be worked towards. In order for China to begin down that road, a completely new mentality and system for managing safety needs to be adapted, namely worker participation.
China Labour Bulletin has consistently called for the government to allow worker participation in the safety monitoring and management systems of the enterprises for which they work. We restate our opinion here that the government should:
- Immediately allow workers to organise and participate in the safety monitoring and management systems of large- and medium-sized state-owned mines;
- Create and maintain a systematised relationship between organised mine workers and government safety monitoring and management agencies, local unions, and media, and provide legal and enforcement guarantees for these relationships.
Of course, such a safety monitoring and management system built upon worker participation is not intended to replace those management measures already adopted by the government. Measures such as mine inspection, rectification or closure of unsafe mines, increased investment in safety equipment and facilities, penalization of mine owners and relevant officials engaged in practices detrimental to workers and continued safety training of miners and management are all vital. However, these measures can only work if the workers themselves are allowed to take control of their own safety and interests.
An important problem here is that the Chinese government does not currently allow workers to independently organise and participate in mine safety monitoring; thus, in any case where management's wishes contravene those of workers, management wins out. Yet people are increasingly realizing that management, especially in illegal mines, are responsible for putting workers in hazardous situations. Recently in Hebei, Shandong and Henan, a few large state-owned mines held discussions on the topic of who really had the highest stake in mine safety. The unanimous conclusion was that the workers who had the most to lose, and thus the highest stake. This demonstrates that both local government officials and mine management personnel have recognized the important role that workers play in safety monitoring and management. However, allowing workers to organise is still such a thorny political issue that without backing from the central government, no decision makers at the local level dare to bring it up.
China's economic structure and social relationships have changed radically since the days of central economic planning; thus, allowing workers to independently organise and participate in safety monitoring and management should be a safety issue, not a political one. The countless mining accidents in China have proven that a major cause of tragedy is that often workers are forced to work in situations they know to be dangerous. An organized and empowered workforce would be able to stop working when dangerous conditions arose and would be able to refuse illegal work orders. The frequency of mine disasters reflects lack of training among miners, the majority of whom lack both experience, safety training, and in many cases even basic training. The workers themselves are not at fault; highly dangerous and offering back-breaking work, coal mines have a high turnover rate, virtually ensuring that workers entering the mines are ill trained. If workers organise, there will be an improvement in their rights and benefits; only at that time will the ranks of mine workers have a basic guarantee of stability and will workers be able to obtain safety-related technical training. Allowing workers to organise also brings up the issue of mutual care. That is to say, in mines with highly dangerous conditions, organised workers will create a "watch out for yourself and for others" safety mentality, which adds safety as an aspect of work responsibilities. Clearly, a stable work force, one able to train and monitor its own workers and who's safety recommendations are respected by the mine owners will be lead to a reduction in accidents. This is something that even the most expensive safety equipment can't provide.
There are two keys crucial to having workers participate in coal mine safety monitoring and management: one is a clear mandate by the government which not only legalises worker organization, but also stipulates that workers have the right to refuse to enter an unsafe mine without fear of dismissal. The other is that workers themselves must be able to choose their own workers. If these two conditions exist, it does not matter what the organisation is called. In view of current realities in China, it could be the lowest level of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in the mines and maintain close connections with the unions at the Federation's county, city, and provincial levels. Not surprisingly, the idea of permitting mine workers to form their own organisation and participate in safety monitoring and management coincides with two matters that the Federation has promoted in recent years; holding democratic elections at the basic union committee level, and establishing unions in industries in which rural workers are concentrated. Therefore, this idea not only shouldn't create a threat to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, it could also provide it with a turning point for true reform and allow the Federation to more effectively protect the rights of the workers they serve.
At this point, I must reiterate that allowing workers to independently organise and participate in mine safety monitoring and management is the most important technical means of solving China's mine safety problem. This thinking is indeed in line with the concept of "establishing independent unions" that China Labour Bulletin has been promoting for many years. But any attempt to use labour-related tragedies in the service of the interests of a ruling party or group is despicable. The convergence of these ideas and concepts simply demonstrates that our thinking is rooted in the reality of China, and therefore that this idea is technically feasible. Why does the Chinese government not see this? Or if they do see it, why are they not promoting it? We feel on this point that Chinese government figures may have be displaying a kind of political hypochondria, manifested by a display of timidity, selfishness, and hypocrisy regarding independent workers. Perhaps they fear that should such an organisation be established, it might develop quickly and threaten their rule. Perhaps they believe that, because this issue is being addressed by "anti-government" figures like us, it may be a kind of Trojan horse.
In conclusion, continued refusal by the Chinese government to allow workers to organise and participate in mine safety and management shows that Chinese leaders are far more concerned with their own positions than with the lives of workers. Failure to protect the lives of Chinese miners through implementation of real and workable strategies paints an ever-clearer picture of the Chinese government's basic "ability to govern" and fundamental moral bottom line. Thus, promises made to the people are little more than cynical, selfish, and timid pretenses. Their tears, however heartfelt, are merely wasted expressions of pity attempting to cover up their true inability to control the results of their reforms.