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Migrant workers and their children

Migrant workers and their children

There are an estimated 274 million rural migrant workers in China, making up more than one third of the entire working population. Migrant workers have been the engine of China’s spectacular economic growth over the last three decades but they remain marginalized and subject to institutionalized discrimination. Their children have limited access to education and healthcare and can be separated from their parents for years on end.

Migrant workers


Rural migrant workers (农民工) are workers with a rural household registration who are employed in an urban workplace. They are not necessarily from rural areas. Many grew up or were even born in the city. They consider the city to be home but, because of the inflexibility of the household registration system, they remain classified as rural migrants.


Household registers have been used by the Chinese authorities for millennia to manage taxation and control migration. The current household registration (Hukou 户口) system was formally introduced by the Communist government in 1958 and was designed to facilitate three main programs: government welfare and resource distribution, internal migration control, and criminal surveillance. Each town and city issued its own domestic passport or hukou, which gave residents access to social welfare services in that jurisdiction. Individuals were broadly categorised as a "rural" or "urban" based on their place of residence. Moreover, the hukou was hereditary so children whose parents held a rural hukou would also have a rural hukou no matter where they are actually born.

The hukou system was supposed to ensure that China’s rural population stayed in the countryside and continued to provide the food and other resources that urban residents needed. However, as the economic reforms of the 1980s gained pace, what the cities needed most was cheap labour. And so began what is often described as one of the greatest human migrations of all time, as hundreds of millions of young men and women from the countryside poured into the factories and construction sites of China’s coastal boom towns. In many cities, such as Shenzhen and Dongguan, the population of migrant workers quickly overtook that of the local urban population.

As migrant workers poured into the cities, it became clear that hukou restrictions on internal migration were not only unenforceable but counter-productive to social and economic development. But it was only in 2003, after the tragic death in police custody of a young migrant worked named Sun Zhigang that the barriers to migration started to come down. Sun had been detained by police in Guangzhou simply because he did not have a temporary resident permit as required by law. The public outcry at Sun’s death led to the abolition of many of the most egregious restrictions on the freedom of movement in place at the time. In many smaller cities, hukou restrictions have gradually been dismantled but the system itself is still very much in place. Indeed, as the urban population continues to grow, the authorities in major cities such as Beijing are now actually making it more difficult for migrant workers and their families to get access to social services.

Migrant worker population growth

According to the annual survey of migrant workers conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, there were 274 million rural labourers working in China's cities in 2014, making up about 36 percent of China’s total workforce of around 770 million. Although the total number of migrant workers has increased steadily over the last decade, the rate of growth has declined noticeably over the last five years from 5.5 percent in 2010 to just 1.9 percent in 2014. This slowdown is in line with the overall contraction of China’s working-age population over the last three years. Restrictive family planning policies introduced in the 1980s mean that fewer and fewer people are entering the workforce and, as such, it seems likely that China’s migrant worker population will peak or at least plateau in the next few years. See chart below.

Migrant workers are typically divided into short and long-distance migrants, with short-distance migrants usually working in a city close to their home area. The number of short-distance (本地) migrants increased by 2.8 percent in 2014 to reach 106 million, while the number of long-distance (外出) migrants rose by a slower rate, 1.3 percent, to stand at 168 million.

Population of Migrant Workers in China 2010-2014 (millions)

Age, gender and education

The gender balance of migrant workers in 2014 was almost exactly two thirds male to one third female. This contrasts markedly with the traditional image of migrant workers as “factory girls” employed in Pearl River Delta sweatshops. Today, as fewer rural migrants enter the workforce and older migrants remain employed, the demographic picture has become much more complicated, although there is a clear trend towards an older population. The proportion of workers aged 16 to 30-years-old fell from 42 percent in 2010 to 34 percent in 2014, while the proportion of workers over 40-years-old has jumped from 34 percent in 2010 to 43 percent last year. See chart below.

The aging population may also explain why the gender balance is shifting towards male workers. Firstly, the retirement age for women workers is 50-years-old, compared to 60 for men. Secondly, when migrant workers start a family, the lack of educational, social and welfare benefits for their children greatly inhibits the ability of both parents to work. In many cases, mothers have no option but to stay at home and look after the children.

Age distribution of migrant workers 2010-2014 (%)

The ageing problem is particularly severe in the construction industry, where in some cities it is virtually impossible to find any workers under 30-years-old. And this ageing trend is likely to continue in the future as younger workers shun what is a dangerous, insecure and poorly paid occupation, and older employees are forced to stay on the job because they have no pension or any other form of social safety net to support them in their old age.

While the majority of migrant workers still only have a middle school education, about 24 percent do now have some form of higher education, including 7.3 percent who went to college. By contrast, only six percent of rural migrants under 30-years-of-age have received any kind of agricultural training, further giving lie to the notion that rural migrant workers in China are in any way “rural.”

Employment patterns and wages

The vast majority of rural migrant workers are still employed in low-paid jobs in manufacturing, construction and services. See chart below.

Employment of migrant workers by sector

The proportion of migrant workers employed in manufacturing has fallen from 36.7 percent in 2010 to 31.3 percent in 2014, reflecting both the decline in China’s manufacturing industry, the relocation of low cost, labour intensive factories to smaller Southeast Asian countries, and more opportunities for migrant workers in other sectors. The number of workers in the construction industry by contrast increased from 16.1 percent in 2010 to 22.3 percent in 2014, as trillions of yuan was spent on infrastructure development. However, that proportion may begin to fall with the end of the building boom and a more measured pace of economic growth in China.

Wage levels for migrant workers have increased steadily over the last five years with the average monthly wage in 2014 reaching 2,864 yuan, up 9.8 percent from the previous year. The highest-paid sectors for migrant workers were transport and logistics (3,301 yuan per month) and construction (3,292 yuan per month), while those employed in household services, sales, hotel and catering services were the lowest paid, earning just over 2,500 yuan per month. See table below.

The average monthly expenditure of migrant workers on basic necessities such as food, housing and transport was estimated at 944 yuan, with around half that amount going on housing alone.

Working conditions and benefits

In addition to low pay, migrant workers generally have to work long hours and have little job security. Long-distance migrants worked on average 25.3 days a month, and 8.8 hours a day. The vast majority (85.4 percent) worked in excess of 44 hours per week.

In 2014, six years after the implementation of the Labour Contract Law, still only 38 percent of migrant workers had signed a formal employment contract with their employer, as required by law. For short-distance migrants, the proportion was even lower, standing at just 33 percent, suggesting that the enforcement of labour laws is even less rigid in China’s inland provinces and smaller cities.

According to the 2014 migrant worker survey, the percentage of migrant workers who experienced wage arrears last year actually dropped to 0.8 percent from 1.0 percent in 2013. That would put the total number of migrant workers with wage arrears at around 2.2 million. The construction industry was the worst offender, with 1.4 percent of the workforce not being paid, down from 1.8 percent in 2013. However, given, that the construction industry experienced a severe downturn in 2014, and the number of wage arrears cases recorded on China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map increased dramatically during the year, it seems unlikely that the number of workers affected by wage arrears would decrease. Indeed, according to the official figures, the average amount of wages in arrears shot up by 17.1 percent to stand at 9,511 yuan for each worker affected.

The proportion of migrant workers with a pension or any form of social security remains at a very low level, around half the national average. The annual survey of migrant workers found that in 2014, only 16.4 percent of long-distance migrants had a pension and 18.2 percent had medical insurance. See chart below. The coverage for work-related injury insurance is higher but this is largely because the employer contributions are comparatively low and many migrant workers are employed in dangerous occupations where it benefits the employer to pay for work-related injury insurance. For more details, see our section on the social security system in China.

Official figures suggest that work safety is improving in China but the numbers of work-related accidents and deaths remain disturbingly high. There were 68,061 work-related deaths recorded in China in 2014. CLB’s new Work Accident Map shows that most accidents and deaths occur in the construction industry, which largely employs migrant workers. Manufacturing also accounted for large numbers of deaths, and service sector employees such as sanitation workers (again often migrants) were at a high risk of death and injury in traffic accidents.

Accident and death rates remain high largely because of lax enforcement of work safety regulations by local government officials and the subordination of workplace safety to productivity and profit. Very few migrant workers are fully aware of the potential hazards in their workplace and hardly any have received adequate safety training.

There are an estimated six million workers in China suffering from the deadly lung disease pneumoconiosis, and the vast majority are poor migrant workers. Most contracted the disease whilst working in mines, construction sites and mineral processing factories in the 1990s and 2000s, and only a small proportion have received the compensation they are entitled under the law. The legal and regulatory system in China, which demands workers prove an employment relationship in order to get compensation, has effectively disqualified millions of victims because they never signed a formal labour contract with their employer. See CLB’s research report Time to Pay the Bill: China’s obligation to the victims of pneumoconiosis, for more details.

Geographical distribution and migration patterns

The flow of rural migrant labour is far from being a simple unidirectional migration from the under-developed inland provinces of central and western China to the more economically developed coastal provinces in the east.

Official statistics for 2014 show that less than half of China’s migrant workers were located in the eastern provinces. The eastern region accounted for 38.9 percent of China’s 274 million migrant workers, the central region accounted for 34.5 percent and the western areas of China, 26.6 percent.

Moreover, it is important to note that less than half of all long-distance migrants actually move from one province to another. Of the 168 million long-distance migrants, 79 million were trans-province migrants while 89 million stayed within their province. Even in the traditional migrant exporting region of central China, only around 41 million migrants moved out of their own province.

The majority of long-distance migrants, about 69 percent, moved to smaller or medium-sized cities, those at prefecture-level or below. Around 23 percent worked in provincial capitals such as Guangzhou and Chengdu, while just 8.1 percent worked in major municipalities such as Beijing and Shanghai. See chart below.

For migrant workers, the cost of living in major cities can be significantly higher than smaller cities closer to home, particularly since migrant workers have to pay more for healthcare, social services and schooling for their children. Moreover, a survey by the Renmin University of China found that over 50 percent of migrant workers experienced helplessness, loneliness and depression whilst living in major cities. They also faced daily discrimination and had a very low sense of belonging.

Increasingly, more and more migrant workers are realizing that long-term separation from their family and community is simply not worth it. One Sichuan migrant, Hou Jun explained that she returned home because of local employment opportunities, lower living costs and a stronger sense of belonging, adding that:

Many friends around us are actually returning to be with their children back home, who are being raised by their grandparents. They realize that not seeing their children grow up is too great of a price to pay, especially now that they might actually be able to save more money for their child's education by going home.

Another migrant planning to leave the city return home is 55-year-old Zou Xiangfu. Zou has to take care of his young grandson and can no longer earn enough money as a delivery man to support his family in Guangzhou. He says raising his grandson at home will be easier. Zou’s story is told in a short film by Jane Li entitled The Grandpa.

The children of migrant workers

In November 2009, China Labour Bulletin published an in-depth report on the children of migrant workers in China. It outlined the problems faced by children left behind in the countryside and those travelling with their parents to cities and examined in detail the central and local government policies that had been put in place to deal with these issues.

Much of the data for that report was based on the 2005 bi-census. In 2013, the All-China Women's Federation published an updated survey, based on the full-2010 census which showed that both the number of left-behind and migrant children had increased, while most of the problems identified in the CLB’s report remained stubbornly in place.

Left-behind children

The All-China Women’s Federation survey estimated that there were about 61 million children under 18-years-of-age who were left behind in the countryside in 2010, accounting for about 22 percent of all children in China, and 38 percent of all rural children. This was an increase of about three million left-behind children over the previous five years. The majority of the left-behind children (57 percent) lived with their grandparents while three percent (mainly teenagers) lived by themselves. Both groups lacked emotional support and care from their parents, it said.

More recent surveys obtained similar results. A survey of 2,130 left-behind children conducted at the end of 2014 by the non-governmental organization On the way to School (上学路上) found that 15 percent of children could go a whole year without seeing their parents, even at Spring Festival. Even telephone contact was limited; about 25 percent of respondents got just one call every three months and four percent got one phone call a year. And a survey conducted in Shandong and published in 2013 found that 75 percent of parents only visited home once a year during the Spring Festival, and five percent visited home once every two to three years. Only 20 percent of parents returned home twice a year or more. Some 61 percent of left-behind children interviewed said their parents telephoned “sometimes” and 28.6 percent responded “rarely.”

In most cases, the grandparents of left-behind children are unable to act as effective substitute parents. The All-China Women’s Federation study found that the average age of grandparents looking after left-behind children was 59.2. They were poorly educated; most had only completed primary school, and could not assist the children with their schoolwork. The grandparents focused on the children's physical needs but often overlooked their developmental and emotional needs.

The 2013 survey in Shandong showed that many left-behind children had some kind of psychological or behavioural problems: Some 29 percent of the interviewees were closed off, lacked confidence or had a sense of inferiority, while another 18 percent tended to be antagonistic, impulsive and anti-social.

Figures released by the Ministry of Public Security in 2011 showed that in most crimes involving minors in rural villages, many of those implicated were left-behind children. A study by Guangzhou University indicated that almost 80 percent of young migrant workers with criminal records were once left behind children

The sexual and physical abuse of children is a serious problem in China and left-behind children are particularly vulnerable. In many villages, the vast majority of parents are working away from home, leaving young children prey to older predatory men. And in most cases the children suffer in silence because they are too scared or ashamed to talk to their guardians. A study on the accident rate of left-behind children in Anhui, moreover, revealed that 46.8 percent of left-behind children had sustained injuries, 13 percent higher than that of children living with their parents.

In an attempt to better protect left-behind children and improve their education prospects, in 2013, the Ministry of Education published a circular promoting a registration system for school-aged left-behind children. The registration system requires local authorities to keep individual records for left-behind children, their guardians, parents and schooling. The information would then be used by local governments to better deploy resources and provide better schools. It was hoped the new system would also allow teachers to identify at risk left-behind children and provide them with the help, care and emotional support.

However, the recent surveys of left-behind children quoted above showed that many children still lack the emotional and psychological support they need for a healthy upbringing.

Migrant children

The All-China Women’s Federation survey estimated that the number of migrant children in China’s cities was 35.8 million in 2010, which represented a 41 percent increase over 2005. Children from rural families accounted for about 80 percent of that total, or about 28.8 million in all.

Despite the substantial increase in numbers, the problems that were faced by migrant children in the past are still very much in evidence today. Children and their parents still face institutionalized discrimination and highly restricted access to local schools and healthcare. Indeed, the 2014 survey of migrant workers showed that the proportion of long-distant migrant workers who moved as a whole family unit was still only around 21 percent, just one percentage point higher than in 2010.

The Compulsory Education Law states that all children should receive nine years schooling from age six onwards. The law stipulates that “the state, community, schools and families shall… safeguard the right of compulsory education of school-age children and adolescents.” For migrant children however, schooling is not always guaranteed. The National Population and Family Planning Commission, estimated in 2012 that 3.5 percent of migrant children in Beijing do not attend school; 5.1 percent of migrant children in Shanghai, and 5.3 percent of those in Guangzhou were not in school, while the national average was two percent.

Public schools are available to migrant children in theory. However, numerous obstacles are routinely placed in their way. In Guangzhou for example, migrant parents have to produce temporary residence permits, work permits, proof of residence, certificates from their place of origin, and household registration booklets simply in order to apply for a school place for their children. In addition, many schools charge migrant families additional fees. Even though the central government banned “temporary student fees” (借读费) at primary and middle schools, many schools get around the regulations by labelling fees differently. Moreover, high schools can still charge "school selection fees", "sponsorship fees" and other miscellaneous fees. Poor migrant families who cannot afford the extra fees and cannot obtain the necessary documents are effectively excluded from public schooling.

In Beijing, the enrolment rate for migrant students in primary and middle school in 2011 was just 70 percent while in Panyu district, south of Guangzhou, only half the number of migrant children were able to find a place in the public school system. Nationally, China’s 2012 human rights report claims that about 80.2 percent of migrant students attend public schools.

However, those who do manage to secure a place in public schools often face prejudice and discrimination. They are often excluded from extracurricular activities and are generally treated as outsiders. According to one survey, 86.3 percent of migrant children were not friends with local children and 7.1 percent did not have any friends.

Private schools often provide a more familiar environment and some schools are relatively affordable but they are often unregulated, over-crowded and have poor facilities. A report on 300 migrant schools in Beijing for example, showed that only 63 were licensed. Teachers’ wages were low and the workload intense. Many teachers accepted jobs in migrant schools only as a stepping stone to a better position at public schools. As a result teacher turnover was high, disrupting the learning schedules of students.

Moreover, unlicensed migrant schools run the risk of being closed down by the authorities on any pretext. The authorities in Beijing in particular have launched regular campaigns to crack down on unlicensed migrant schools claiming they were unsafe. In reality, many demolished schools had passed numerous checks. The principal of the demolished Tianyuan Primary School for example, pointed out that the school had spent 100,000 yuan on building repairs and fire safety. In many cases, the real reason for school demolition was to make way for new commercial and luxury housing developments.

In most cases, teachers, parents and students were not informed in advance of the school closure and only discovered it when they saw the closure notice posted on the school gate. Hongxing Primary School for example, was closed down in 2011. Within a few hours of the closure being announced, the school buildings were demolished with all the desks, chairs and students' artwork buried in the debris. A survey of migrant families whose children’s schools had been closed found that only 13.6 percent of students had found a place in the public school system, about half went to another migrant school elsewhere in the city, and one third of the students were sent “home” to the countryside.

In 2013, the Chaoyang district government in eastern Beijing launched a new crackdown, pledging to close the 20 remaining migrant schools in the district. Officials claimed they would offer migrant students places in public schools but parents worried that the schools were too far away from their homes and that students had problems adjusting to the new regime. Others said they could not obtain all the necessary documentation to qualify for a school place. In the end, children either ended up at poorer quality private schools commissioned by the local government or returned to their parents’ home town.

The final educational hurdle for migrant children has always been the national university entrance examination. Even if they have spent nine years in an urban school, students nearly always have to take the exam in their home town. And because each region sets its own curriculum, migrant students are at a distinct disadvantage. Moreover, many migrant students who return home to study high-school have trouble adapting to this new environment and simply drop out.

There have been attempts to open up university entrance exams to migrant students and some students can now sit for the entrance exams in the city they are residing in. However the threshold for eligibility is high, making such concessions effectively worthless. It is estimated that more than 20 provinces will relax exam restrictions to some degree but that only a few thousand migrant students will benefit in the whole of 2013. Any further relaxation of the system will meet strong resistance from local students and their parents who are concerned that competition for university places will intensify if more migrant students become eligible.

For migrant families on a low income, the cost of seeing a doctor in China’s commercialized healthcare system can be prohibitively expensive. In 2010, the average medical consultation and medication fee in community clinics was 83 yuan and the average fee for in-patient services was 2,358 yuan. The average monthly income for young migrant workers in 2010 was just 1,660 yuan. This means that many families will only visit a doctor in dire emergencies, when it is often too late. According to a report released by Shaoxing Women and Children’s Hospital in 2011, the death rate of migrant children aged below five was ten percent, compared with about five percent for local children.

The central government has introduced several insurance schemes over the last two decades designed to make healthcare services more affordable for migrant workers. However, the children of migrant workers often fall outside the remit of such schemes. A 2012 survey in Cixi, Zhejiang for example found that 57 percent of migrant children did not have any medical insurance.

There are three main types of medical insurance in China but none of them effectively covers migrant children before they start school.

  • The basic medical insurance scheme for urban employees should cover all urban workers, including migrant workers, but few migrant workers are covered in reality. Indeed, official figures from 2012 show that only 16.9 percent of rural migrant workers employed outside their home area had employee medical insurance, just four percent higher than in 2008. And even those that do have insurance have to present a certificate of study for their children to qualify for benefits and this therefore effectively excludes pre-school migrant children and those in unregistered private schools from the scheme.
  • The urban resident basic medical insurance scheme covers unemployed urban citizens, including students and retirees but not migrant workers.
  • The new rural co-operative medical care scheme is often the only option for poor migrant families with pre-school children. However, this scheme is designed to cover only rural residents and as such it requires individuals to purchase insurance and claim compensation in their hometown, which makes it impractical for migrant workers.

Some regional governments have set up insurance schemes for minors regardless of their hukou. Migrant children in Shenzhen and Hangzhou for example can get the same level of insurance as local children but this is far from a nation-wide practice.

In addition, many regional governments have implemented vaccination schemes that include both local and migrant children. However the take up rate of migrant children is usually lower because their parents are not as well informed about such schemes as local residents.

The high mobility of migrant children can also make it more difficult for the officials to determine their health history and as such some regional governments have pioneered a registration system for migrant children aged under 16 aimed at enhancing communication between children’s home towns and their cities of residence, sharing data on social security, healthcare and education. The registration system usually takes the form of issuing a card which grants migrant children access to social services in cities that have signed up to the scheme.

Hukou reform

A majority of people in China probably agree that the household registration system is archaic and unfair and that rural hukou holders working in the cities should be given greater access to schooling, social and medical welfare benefits.

A Caixin editorial in March 2012 described the system as “morally indefensible in today’s China,” adding that:

Reform of the hukou system would represent a timely investment in human capital that is conducive to economic growth. There is broad consensus that China should move forward with more hukou adjustments. Years have been spent preparing for change, and now the first steps have been taken. It's time for more.

However, there is also considerable resistance from urban residents to relaxation of restrictions. Urban governments often do not have the financial resources to expand provision of social services to include all migrant workers and their families. There is also resistance from the police to wholesale hukou reform, at least until an alternative system of national identity cards can be put in place that can ensure effective surveillance and tracking of criminals.

At present, hukou reform has been limited to piecemeal reform at the local level, with individual regions relaxing restrictions for certain rural migrant workers, in most cases those from the same province and those who have already made a demonstrable contribution to the local economy. That approach seems destined to continue for the foreseeable future.

Despite central government pledges to accelerate hukou reform, the rate and extent of reform will ultimately be dictated by the needs and abilities of individual provinces and cities. At a conference on hukou reform on 15 June 2012, Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun stressed that although hukou reform was in the interests of everyone, it should always take into account the “load-bearing ability” (承载力) of individual cities. In other words, migrants’ access to urban resources will continue to be restricted until urban governments are willing and able to provide welfare services for all.


If, at some point, the central government in Beijing does develop the political will to push through hukou reform, China Labour Bulletin recommends it takes the following action:

  • Decouple the link between the hukou and the provision of social services. All children living in the same city should have the same rights to health and education services, social advancement and social participation.
  • Make urban governments solely responsible for welfare provision in the cities. China’s cities are the clear beneficiaries of rural-urban migration and should no longer pass the costs of welfare provision on to poorer rural governments.
  • Make greater efforts towards urban integration. Social acceptance by the resident urban population is the key to the smooth progress of hukou reform.
  • Invest more in rural education and healthcare. As well as building new schools and health clinics, better qualified teachers and medical staff should be recruited. Salaries should be increased and paid on time.